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‘Elephants can’t gallop’: Performativity, knowledge and power in the 
market for lay-investing  
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines lay-investment in financial markets (investment by members of the 
general public) as a practice performed by marketing knowledge. It follows the market 
studies programme (Araujo, Finch, & Kjellberg, 2010) to examine a problem that puzzles 
researchers in finance: why do lay-investors remain in the market despite their poor returns? 
Using a qualitative study of lay-investors in the United Kingdom, it considers the devices, 
‘agencements’ and discourses that structure investment behaviour. It uses Foucault’s writing 
on governance under neo-liberalism to suggest that investors are constituted as self-
entrepreneurs, sustained by antagonism to professional investors, heterodox market beliefs 
and a consumer allegiance to investment styles and products. Marketing knowledge is 
inscribed in market devices and structures market relations. Finally, it suggests that self-
discipline and confession are normalising technologies that help investors cope with 
difficulties and losses in the market. The paper develops theoretical linkages between the 
literatures of performativity and governmentality. 
 
Summary statement of contribution: The paper expands the market studies literature through 
an analysis of the governance of lay-investors and their construction as productive economic 
agents. Marketing knowledge is presented as performative and crucial in to coordinating the 
construction of economic agency.   
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Introduction 
 
Recent developments in marketing research have begun to question some of the taken for 
granted assumptions of the discipline (Saren et al., 2007; Tadajewski, 2010). In particular, the 
project of (re)writing markets into marketing (Araujo et al., 2010:2) has critiqued marketing 
research for representing ‘markets as passive backgrounds, against which marketers have got 
on with the serious business of organising sellers’ exchanges with buyers’. Araujo et al. 
emphasise instead the practical nature of market outcomes and argue that marketing 
knowledge is ‘performative’: marketing knowledge co-ordinates and informs the ‘feedback 
loops’ (Barnes, 1983) of knowledge and action that constitute social life. Following Callon 
(1998) they suggest that that markets are better understood as the collective achievements of 
hybrid, distributed agents, and that transactions are framed by devices, categories and market 
scripts. Marketing knowledge is central to such distributed agencies: inscribed in the material, 
technical and linguistic architectures of markets it coordinates the production of market 
participants, and the development of the social ‘embeddedness’ (Granovetter, 1985) of 
market relations. 
 
In this paper I hope to shed some light on a puzzle that has long preoccupied researchers in 
academic finance: the existence – or perhaps persistence – of non-professional, or ‘lay-’ 
investors. These individuals (loosely defined as those investing their own money, not 
employed or trading within financial institutions) are among the least respected and 
successful of market participants. Wall Street folklore holds that they are ‘dumb’ (De Bondt, 
1998) and the activities of non-professional investors have been persistent source of concern 
for those researchers who have investigated them. A leading scholar in finance, De Bondt 
(1998:832) describes his survey of the ‘Fox Valley investors’ as ‘a sorry picture’, and a 
substantial body of research has demonstrated that their returns are systematically below 
those offered by the market (Barber & Odean, 2000; Barber, Lee, Liu, & Odean, 2009; 
Brennan, 1995; De Bondt, 1998, 2005; Kumar & Lee, 2006). 
 
I suggest another reading of the lay-investor: as a docile body of neo-liberalism (Foucault, 
2008), with investor subjectivities constructed by the discourses of the market and inscribed 
in its devices. To develop such an argument, I explore the points of contact between notions 
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of governance and performativity, between marketing knowledge and power. I make use of 
Michel Foucault’s writing on power, and particularly Foucault’s later work on 
‘governmentality’ (Gordon, 1991), circulations and ‘bio-politics’ (Foucault, 2008); under the 
bio-political regime, the preeminent mode of subjectification is the entrepreneurial-self, 
disciplined and measured by market mechanisms (Munro, 2012). My approach parallels 
moves in consumer research, which has long recognized the role of objects in consumer 
identity and culture (Belk, 1988; Schouten & Alexander, 1995), to consider ‘post-social’ 
consumption objects including the stock market (Zwick & Dholakia, 2006). However, the 
paper’s critically informed position offers a more cautious assessment of post-social 
consumption as embodying ‘immaterial labour’ and proliferating, recursive power relations  
than the utopian visions of, for example, Arvidsson’s (2010) consumer publics.  
 
I argue that non-professional investors are constructed by their interactions with the 
investment services market. Through products and services purchased in the consumer-
oriented investment service market they come to understand the financial market as 
possessing particular ontological characteristics and demanding appropriate strategies. 
Investors make use of devices, for example, software programs, magazines and training 
courses and printed lists, investment shows and seminars, inscribed with such strategies to 
produce a version of the market in which they can participate. Marketing knowledge becomes 
market knowledge, a heterodox conception of market function that binds investors to 
investment service providers through entanglements of (sometimes secret) knowledge, 
discourse, specialised tools and personal, even emotional, relationships. Lay-investors define 
themselves in opposition to the professional finance industry, and see their activities as a 
means of taking control of their economic destiny and constructing a better future for 
themselves. The motif of self-entrepreneurship pervades investor narratives, simultaneously 
freeing and subjectifying, providing new opportunities for marketers and new possibilities for 
the circulation of capital. The interplay between performative knowledge and power, 
embedded in performative discourses and socio-material devices, becomes visible in the 
heterogeneous material agencements that is the lay-investor.   
 
The paper will first of all develop a theoretical framework of market devices and neoliberal 
governance. It then presents an analysis of an empirical study of lay-investors conducted in 
the prolonged bull market leading up to 2008. The analysis follows the investor ‘career’ from 
decisions and motivations to invest to the development of individualised calculative agencies, 
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understood as investment subjectivities. I employ the Foucauldian notion of confession to 
examine the normalising devices by which investors stay in the market despite sustained poor 
performance. The paper then concludes.  
 
 
Market devices and neo-liberal governance 
 
In this section I elaborate on analytic similarities and useful commonalities between the 
‘agencements’ of market studies literature and the technologies of subjectification envisaged 
by Foucauldian scholars. I suggest that the narrow conception of power as calculative ability 
offered in ‘market studies’ analysis (e.g. Callon & Muniesa, 2005) can be strengthened 
through a Foucauldian perspective of governmentality (Gordon, 1991). I argue that the 
insights offered by a Foucauldian emphasis on discourses and scripts exercised in the 
construction of subjectivities (Foucault, 1977) may be elaborated by the ability of 
‘agencements’ to accommodate multiple agencies within a market actor, understood as a 
heterogeneous calculative network.  
 
My analysis complements existing moves to write markets back into marketing; Araujo et al. 
(2010:5) emphasise the performative nature of marketing knowledge in organising markets: 
market theories give shape to market exchange, as templates for cognitive action or inscribed 
in material architectures and calculative devices. Marketing knowledge, alongside other 
forms of technical economic reasoning, plays ‘an important role in causing markets to exist 
as both objects of representation and intervention’ (Araujo et al., 2010:7). The move to 
understand markets as the focal point of organisational efforts and social performances has 
been motivated by studies of the practice and production of science and technology 
(MacKenzie, 2009) and has been developed by the conceptual apparatus of science and 
technology studies (Latour, 2007). Markets come to be seen, not as things-in-themselves, but 
as products of the organizing and stabilizing of ‘heterogeneous’ (Law, 1999) material agents 
(Latour, 2007), held together by their material and linguistic arrangements (Çalışkan & 
Callon, 2009, 2010). 
 
Scholars in marketing have already incorporated these material and discursive market devices 
into marketing theory: the importance of market devices has been demonstrated, for example, 
in mass retail (Cochoy, 2008; Kjelberg, 2007), industrial markets (Azimont & Araujo, 2010) 
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and business to business marketing (Mason & Spring, 2011). Cochoy (2008), for example, 
draws attention to the importance of the socio-material architectures of the supermarket, 
mundane though they may be: the supermarket trolley becomes a central actor in a hybrid 
calculative process involving qualitative and quantitative logics, coordinating a group of 
shoppers and offering them a rule of thumb estimate of expenditure as they progress through 
the store. In Vargha’s (2011) study, mortgage advisers and customers work to perform the 
financial products, often using computer-based visualisations, a process that stabilises and 
makes visible the needs and preferences of consumers while moving towards an eventual 
sale. In the high reaches of finance, investment bank traders encounter the market as an 
‘epistemic object’, a ‘flow architecture’ always unrolling into the future (Knorr Cetina, 2005; 
Knorr Cetina & Bruegger, 2000). In each case, processes of consumption are active and 
ongoing – economies of qualities (Callon, Méadel, & Rabeharisoa, 2002), or epistemic 
projects – where the consumer is implicated in the business of developing and articulating 
value. These studies may, however, be differentiated from governmentality writings by the 
absence of notions of the responsibility of consumers as economic subjects: to consume.  
The intention of this paper is to explore marketing knowledge as a form of performative 
governmentality; to connect the literature of governance (Gordon, 1991) and of economic 
performativity (Callon, 1998). The foundations for my arguments are already in place. 
Performativity arguments imply that economic agency is governed and governable (Callon, 
2008), that markets are a meeting place for politics and value (Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2010) 
and that power asymmetries manifest themselves through disparities in calculative resources. 
In order to develop commonalities between performativity and governmentality studies it is 
necessary to explore how localized, individual economic agencies, understood as 
agencements, come to be constituted as productive, docile economic citizens. 
 
From market devices to governmentality 
 
In this paper I make use of Michel Foucault’s writing on power, particularly his later works, 
to explore further the governance of economic agency. I ask how the performative nature of 
marketing knowledge gives rise to the subjectivities of individual economic actors, in this 
case lay-investors, and how these subjectivities are bound up in agencements of material 
devices and heterodox market theories. Foucault’s early work saw power as focused on the 
body, where ‘technologies of government’ constitute the subjectivities of those governed, 
whether as ‘docile bodies’, productive and useful members of society or as carefully 
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classified misfits: the sick, or the insane (Foucault, 1976, 1978).  In his later writing on ‘bio-
politics’ however, of more relevance to this study, his attention shifts to the governance of 
populations through the bio-political sciences: statistics, demographics, and epidemiology, 
for example. His attention moves from architectural and optical surveillance of individuals to 
a society-wide mode of governance administered through normal distributions and 
knowledge of the population. Where earlier disciplinary apparatus ‘encloses, fixes and 
confines,’ the bio-political apparatus organizes the circulation of commodities, consumers 
and production, fragmenting identity and proliferating consumption (Munro, 2012), a 
limitless production of individual representations that is ‘circular, recursive and self-
reproducing’ (Zwick & Knott, 2009).   
 
For Foucault, the change in disciplinary gaze is accompanied by a transformation of the 
social contract, where the economic agent is no longer a partner in an exchange relationship, 
but an entrepreneurial self, and the embodiment of human capital. The neoliberal concept of 
economic agency demands ‘continuous intervention and regulation within the social fabric to 
promote competitive social relations and entrepreneurial culture’ (Munro, 2012:348). Under 
neoliberal economics, even consumption is the productive responsibility of the individual: 
‘The man of consumption, in so far as he consumes, is a producer. What does he 
produce? Well, quite simply, he produces his own satisfaction. And we should think 
of consumption as an enterprise activity by which the individual, precisely on the 
basis of the capital he has at his disposal, will produce something that will be his own 
satisfaction’ (Foucault, 2008:226) 
Foucault’s later work found a ready audience, thanks to a few relatively early publications 
(Foucault, 1980; Gordon, 1991) and his notion of ‘governmentality’ prominence through the 
writing of Nikolas Rose and others, who explore ‘the complex of mundane programs, 
calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities 
seek to embody and give effect to government ambitions’ (Rose and Miller 1992:175, cited 
Azimont and Araujo, 2010: 96). More recently, Hardt and Negri’s Marxist re-reading has 
bought forms of ‘immaterial labour’ to prominence in, for example, analyses of the online 
reputation economy of ‘modders’ and ‘tweeters’ (Arvidsson, 2010; Zwick & Knott, 2009). 
Crucial to the concept of immaterial labour is the notion that human nature is the raw material 
transformed through production   (Munro, 2012:355): the self-entrepreneur must go to work 
first of all upon the resources offered by the self, and the aesthetic adventures of consumers 
become the raw material from which value can be extracted. Immaterial labour, tweets and 
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likes, constitute an ‘untoward land’, where ‘every moment becomes an opportunity to both 
make a sale and explore the subsequent moments’ (Thrift, 2013:146). 
 
Often, market studies literature lends itself to a critical, governmentality retelling. Credit 
scores constitute a new form of borrower to be targeted by lenders, and a new conception of 
risk is malleable and calculable (Leyshon & Thrift, 1999). Through the entanglements of the 
credit score, the borrower is caught up in a novel, neoliberal, investor subjectivity: the 
homeowner, the small-scale property developer and rentier (Leyshon & French, 2009).  
The ‘entrepreneurial self’ comprises ‘a kind of machination, a hybrid of flesh, artefact, 
knowledge, passion and technique’ (Rose, 1996:153), where attachment and affect bind 
individuals and devices, as consumers seek out post-social, or quasi-social relationships. So, 
for example, in Deville’s (2012) account of debt collection, agencies bind debtors to new 
relationships through ‘affect’: bodily action, emotion, obligation and anxiety. This process of 
attachment becomes of primary interest to researchers, and central to my investigation of the 
lay-investor. 
 
A ‘performed’ lay-investor  
 
Researchers in academic finance have been fascinated by lay-investors. Survey research (De 
Bondt, 1998, 2005) and extensive quantitative examinations of trading patterns (e.g. Barber et 
al., 2009) have stressed the poor returns achieved by these market participants. Lay-investors 
are thought to be ‘noise traders’, are irrational, and are closely linked to the many deviations 
from market efficiency that researchers have identified. Internet-based information sources 
are unreliable, prone to ‘pump-and-dump’ manipulation (Sabherwal, Sarkar, & Zhang, 2011); 
Antweiler  and Frank (2004:1260) suggest that people posting on internet message boards are 
the ‘real world counterparts of the noise traders that are so often invoked in financial theory’. 
As the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970, 1991) has come under increasing pressure 
from behavioural economics and finance, researchers have supplied a huge body of evidence 
to support the conjecture that heuristic-based judgements give rise to sub-optimal market 
behaviour. Reviews and summaries of this extensive literature are offered by (Byrne & 
Brooks, 2008; Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Teoh, 2001). 
 
Finance research focuses on individuals as rational, individuals possessed of free choice. 
Critical approaches in marketing, often motivated by Foucault’s writing (e.g. Saren et al., 
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2007), consider such freedom as a rhetorical legitimation of market arrangements, and have 
sought to establish the means by which such legitimation takes place. In marketing 
proposition, one might argue, there is considerable subtlety to ‘the art of making free market 
behaviour, in staging very tightly the freedom of the actor while at the same time respecting it 
deeply’ (Cochoy & Venn, 2007:205). This Foucauldian ‘captation’ seeks to explain how 
organized contexts, such as firms or administrations, seek to exert a hold over fluid publics. 
Approaching markets as collective achievements driven by marketing knowledge suggests, 
on the other hand, that analytical focus be directed upon the ‘agencements’ (Muniesa, Millo, 
& Callon, 2007) of market action. The emphasis must be to show how particular 
agencements, around individual investors, are formed: how the process of attachment takes 
place. 
 
Central to my argument is the recursive dialectic of marketing and market knowledge. The 
market exists in no tangible form: it is instantiated through screens, telephones, and other 
such ‘scoping’ devices (Knorr Cetina, 2005). Thus, manifestations and knowledge of the 
market are inseparable from the means of production, which is itself governed by market 
knowledge; just as differing laboratory apparatus may produce differing yet equally valid 
‘worlds’ from the same data (Law & Urry, 2004), or different clinical regimes may interpret 
the same cluster of symptoms in differing ways (Mol, 1999), so the arbitrageurs of high 
finance coax profits from anomalies between multiple market worlds conjured from uniform  
price data (Beunza & Stark, 2004). In the case of lay-investors the market must also be 
worked on to be consumed (Mayall, 2007; Zwick & Dholakia, 2006). Investors must 
purchase products to visualise and manipulate the market, and those products serve to 
stabilize and perform a particular market ontology; market knowledge is embedded in the 
scoping devices through which investors produce and consume the market. Thus profit 
opportunities, and so and the marketing of investment services as a source of those profit 
opportunities, is contingent upon a given knowledge of the market. The proliferation of 
market worlds, and associated opportunities – as many as there are competing investment 
devices – is a rich source of market differentiation and customer entanglement for investment 
service providers.  
 
Screens and the interactions they permit are the basic component of market activity for lay-
investors (Preda, 2009; Roscoe, 2013), although a reliance on technology to see the market is 
nothing new. Preda (2006) shows how lay-investment was initially coordinated by the 
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tickertape and has charted the development of technical analysis as a consequence of the 
relationship. Roscoe and Howorth (2009) (Roscoe & Howorth, 2009)show how different 
conceptions of market order, such as the existence of trends, or hidden patterns and numbers, 
necessitate different calculative strategies when investing. Investment methods are also 
influenced by investment discourses, which display a remarkable consistency around the 
globe, whether in the US (Harrington, 2007), Australia (Mayall, 2006) or Taiwan (Chen, 
2013). In summary, the present paper develops these studies by reflecting on the role of 
marketing knowledge in performing the lay-investor: I argue that marketing knowledge is 
embedded in the heterodox discourses and devices of lay-investment, and enacted through 
hybrid agencements. At the same time it contributes to a performative discourse of 
entrepreneurial self-management, producing the differentiated subjectivity of, for example, 
the technical analyst, or the small-cap investor. By doing so I hope to frame and explore the 
initial question: why do investors keep on investing?  
 
Methodology 
 
The intention of this project was to provide a holistic and contextualised understanding of the 
activities of non-professional investors that allow us to generate a plausible, trustworthy 
contribution to theory (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006).  The potential issues of observer bias 
and limitations in data access, ever present in qualitative research, were addressed through 
the use of comprehensive description, multiple methods and observations, allowing us to 
corroborate findings across methods and data sources (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2006).  Data available for analysis comprised interview transcripts, field notes, 
responses to the survey questionnaire, media articles, specialist online sources, and marketing 
materials for investor products. 
 
Non-professional investors are difficult to access due to the isolated and often invisible nature 
of their occupation; qualitative studies have tended to recruit volunteers through social 
gatherings, public meetings (Mayall, 2006) and investment clubs (Harrington, 2007). This 
project took a similar approach. I visited investment seminars and shows and used a short 
questionnaire to generate background data and as a means of facilitating interview requests. I 
attended a total of five days’ of investor events. These comprised an annual, two day investor 
fair in London, which we visited in 2005 and 2006, with the permission of the organizer. The 
event attracts 5,000 or so individuals, and targets a broad base of non-professional investors. I 
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also visited two evening seminar events organized by an online financial media company. 
The events were held in London, near to the financial district, and targeted non-professional 
investors: the first focused on ‘small-cap’ investing, and the second billed itself as a ‘Trader’s 
evening’ with a focus on technical analysis and leveraged products. At each there was an 
audience of about 70 individuals. 
 
Three full days and two evenings of attendance at these events (with time equally divided 
between observation and questionnaire administration) yielded 95 questionnaires, generating 
21 potential interviewees. Of these, 13 individuals were finally interviewed, others failing to 
return calls, agreeing to speak at a time when they proved unavailable, and leaving false or 
out of date contact details. As a corrective to the contingent nature of the recruiting process, 
advertisements were posted on bulletin boards and interviewees were asked to recommend 
colleagues who were willing to be interviewed (a snowballing method). A further six 
interviewees were contacted through these methods. In total 24 interviews were conducted 
with 19 non-professional investors. Five investors (Anne, George, Nigel, Simon and Stewart) 
were interviewed a second time after an interval of six months in order to investigate 
emerging topics. Interviews lasted between 25 and 50 minutes. Four interviews were 
conducted face to face and the remainder were conducted by telephone.  Telephone 
interviewing allowed me to interview a geographically dispersed group of interviewees and it 
avoided potential ethical issues involved with interviewing individuals in their own homes.  
Despite my efforts, I was unable to gain access to an investment club, although clubs featured 
in interview material.  
 
Table 1 presents basic data for each interviewee.  Of the investors interviewed, just three had 
previously worked in the financial sector (Peter, Robert and Stewart). Others worked in a 
range of sectors, with several attempting to trade or invest for a living.  
 
Data were analysed from an early stage in the research process through comparison and re-
comparison (Boeije, 2002). Themes were identified within interviews and across interviews; 
thematically clustered matrices (Miles and Huberman, 1994) were built to incorporate themes 
from literature as well as emerging themes in the data. Themes were explored in later, more 
structured interviews (Glaser, 1965). Data saturation was considered to have been reached 
when analysis of interview and observation data contributed no new themes (Eisenhardt, 
1991; Boeije, 2002); saturation was also evidenced by an increasing homogeneity of 
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accounts, with investors detailing similar methods and articulating similar discourses of 
investing, for example with stock phrases of investment activity occurring frequently in 
interviews. The accounts offered by investors recruited through advertisement or referral did 
not present any additional alternative or striking themes. There is a heavy weighting of older 
investors with correspondingly larger portfolios, often representing pension savings. This is 
likely to be a consequence of recruiting at day-time investor fairs, where retired individuals 
were more likely to attend. Once again, use of advertising and recruitment by referral help to 
compensate for this potential bias.  
 
Table 1: Interviewees 
Pseudonym Gender # of interviews Age Investor type Portfolio size 
Albert M 1 60 or over S,C £101k-£150k 
Anne F 2 60 or over S £201k+ 
Chris M 1 50-59 C £151k-£200k 
George M 2 40-49 S,C £201k+ 
James M 1 60 or over S,C £101k-£150k 
Karl M 1 30-39 S £51k-£100k 
Max M 1 40-49 C £50k or less 
Mickey M 2 60 or over C * 
Mike M 1 60 or over S £101k-£150k 
Nigel M 2 30-39 S,C £201k+ 
Peter M 1 30-39 S £101k-£150k 
Robert M 2 60 or over S,C £51k-£100k 
Simon M 2 40-49 S,C * 
Stewart M 2 60 or over S £201k+ 
Sunil M † 40-49 * * 
Terry M 1 30-39  C £50k or less 
Tony M 1 40-49 C £151k-£200k 
Trevor M 1 60 or over S £201k+ 
William M † 50-59 * * 
* Not known †Interviews not recorded 
S – Small-cap investor   C - Chartist 
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The entrepreneurial ‘agencements’ of investment 
 
This section will explore how lay-investors acquire an understanding of the financial markets 
– how they purchase, quite literally, this understanding through the consumer-facing 
investment service market. As a conceptual structure, I follow the investor career. From the 
outset of their investing careers these individuals encounter the marketing knowledge of 
service providers as embedded in knowledge of the markets. That is to say: heterodox notions 
of market function, passed from service provider to investor, and between investors, become 
the marketing knowledge by which products and services are sold. That same knowledge is 
written into devices, perhaps by being used as the basis for software design, or by the 
production and dissemination of investment metrics;  parallels from the world of professional 
finance can be found in a hedge fund’s home-made yield calculator (Hardie & MacKenzie, 
2007) or options prices sold to traders (MacKenzie, 2006). Market knowledge becomes the 
script according to which investment is practiced, the theoretical underpinning of the 
investment agencement, and as such it is also marketing knowledge. Market participants find 
themselves constituted as investors of a particular kind, tied to products, knowledge, and 
ways of understanding the market that bind them to particular providers.  
 
First performative discourse: taking control of one’s financial future 
In Foucault’s analysis of contemporary economic governance, individuals are seen as making 
entrepreneurial projects of their selves. The consumer produces her own satisfaction through 
the capital she has at her disposal; human nature itself becomes the raw material for 
production and productive activities. Under neo-liberalism, self-entrepreneurship ‘links up a 
seductive ethics of the self, a powerful critique of contemporary institutional and political 
reality, and an apparently coherent design for the radical transformation of contemporary 
social arrangements’(Rose, 1996:153). In other words, the responsibility for economic self-
direction thrust upon the individual is matched by dissatisfaction with existing arrangements 
and the existence of imaginative possibilities about the future.  
 
Marketing knowledge as first encountered by would-be investors takes the form of  a 
performative entrepreneurial discourse concerning notions of fairness, appropriate rewards, 
self-determination and resistance to financial institutions. A recurring theme across 
interviews was that the original decision to become an investor was driven by hostility to the 
financial services sector and investment professionals. Individuals were motivated by a desire 
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to take control of their savings or pensions, rather than leaving them in the hands of 
professionals whom they perceived as condescending, greedy, and incompetent. Robert 
explains his decision to transfer his retirement savings and pensions into a self-managed 
scheme:  
‘All my pensions got rolled up into Equitable Life a couple of years ago, and I 
realised that I’m losing a lot of money here, and I lost confidence in the financial 
services industry and decided I was going to have to do something myself with what 
I’ve got left.’  
While Anne said:  
‘It irritates me that I’ve got to pay all this money to somebody to manage [my 
portfolio], but the answer to that is ‘Of course, well, they can do a better job than 
you,’ [but] they don’t always get such wonderful results.’  
Max, who was ‘quite cynical’ about professionals’ performance, felt that the focus on 
benchmarks, even in a falling market, does not constitute ‘good stewardship’, and Mike 
advised that new investors avoid the professional fund managers because ‘they don’t do very 
well.’ Investors were confident in their own ability to outsmart those who would exploit the 
naive investor, their common-sense reasoning exemplified by this comment from Albert:  
 ‘Hot air, in a word. Two words. They are very dedicated people. A broker comes on 
the phone to me and starts talking about why don’t I buy such and such a share, the 
simple answer is if it’s so darn good he would have bought it himself and he wouldn’t 
be telling me about it.’ (Albert) 
 
Like the debt collection agencies described by Deville (2012, 2013) the strategies of 
investment service firms relied on building  affective attachment to those who are encouraged 
to better themselves financially. Strategies themselves necessarily differ - where agencies 
stimulated visceral reactions of panic and bodily engagement with letters and telephone calls 
– investment service firms offer excitement, risk, and the chance of ‘outsmarting the large 
brokers, finding good opportunities that are likely to do really, really well but nobody knows 
about them, because nobody investigates them’ (Simon). Equally, negative affects – hostility 
and anger – also tie investors to service providers, which were quick to capitalise on the 
investors’ distrust, and to present themselves as allies in a struggle against the monolithic 
financial sector. The investment writer Tom Bulford – whom Simon followed closely – 
promoted himself thus:  
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‘I love banking big stock market gains – especially if it’s on the blindside of other 
investors. Seven years ago I quit my high-flying career in the Square Mile to join a 
newsletter called...’  
In contrast to faceless financial institutions, service providers presented themselves, or their 
‘investment celebrity’ representatives, as personal figures with whom bonds and attachments 
could be made. Though never having met him Simon referred to ‘my friend Mr Bulford’, and 
trusted his judgement: ‘I have to rely on my friend Mr Bulford to say what effect [news] is 
going to have’. Other individuals made themselves available in person at shows and 
seminars, whether to exercise symbolic capital as an expert, or to build personal relationships 
with their clients. Albert remarked that he would follow one person, whom he had met at 
exhibitions ‘to the end of the earth’.  
 
Once established as investors, the same feelings of hostility provided an ongoing motivation, 
as lay-investors positioned themselves in opposition to the larger players. Chris believed that 
‘the financial markets…are manipulated quite cynically…you can actually see [the big 
players’] muddy footprints all over the market.’ Simon described his investing as a way of 
‘outsmarting the large brokers, finding good opportunities that are likely to do really, really 
well but nobody knows about them, because nobody investigates them. And,’ he said, ‘it’s 
really satisfying’. According to Robert, the ‘small private investor’ stands against the 
‘insiders’: ‘I know in theory all news is supposed to come out through the official channels 
but I’m not sure it does happen quite that way’. For Terry, facing the professionals is: 
‘thrilling…you’ve got hundreds and hundreds of highly paid investment analysts… 
there’s me sitting at home… and those [analysts are] sitting there with millions of 
pounds of software and a couple of PhDs in mathematics and they’re still getting it 
wrong’.  
 
A second performative discourse: the promise of high returns 
 
Beating the professionals at their own game is not quite enough – investors want to do it in 
style. Although, with their emphasis on systems and rationality, investors would not classify 
themselves as gamblers, there remains a seductive discourse of high returns, particularly in 
the small company sector. George explained: 
‘I invested from a seed-cap stage [into a company] that’s gone from minimal 
revenues, I think this year they are going to do something like 20 or 25 million in 
  Elephants can’t gallop 
16 
 
revenues… got a market cap of something like 60 million. So that’s the success story 
side of things, that’s what I’m trying to replicate.’ 
The discourse can be summed up by variants of the phrase ‘elephants don’t gallop’ even 
followed by ‘fleas can jump ten times their own height’.  
‘Shares will rocket up on a very thin story. And they have got more chance of 
rocketing up in price…the old [saying] elephants don’t gallop…if the capitalisation is 
only £100m it’s got a chance of doubling.’ (Robert) 
‘The advantage of an AIM stock is that it’s much more volatile and if you get it right 
the volatility works in your favour, as I’ve said to you elephants don’t run.’ (Albert) 
The metaphor of earthbound pachyderms has been attributed to the famous investment guru 
Jim Slater and appears frequently in the investment media, as in this example, from 
‘Incademy Investor Education’: ‘Elephants don’t gallop; fleas can jump ten times their own 
height. Therein lies the attraction of small caps’1. Simon attributed his knowledge of the 
phrase, and the accompanying discourse, directly to the marketing materials that he 
consumes:  
‘The thing about small-caps is, we get told a lot that they are more agile than larger 
companies…they can change their direction to suit current market conditions…’ 
‘We get told a lot? By whom?’ 
‘I guess by people in the press, by people at seminars, they say elephants don’t run…. 
 ‘’’’‘’’‘’’’ 
The relatively small portfolios of many interviewees necessitate higher returns, especially for 
those who desire to make a living as investors. The expectation of high returns is therefore a 
precondition of the lifestyle and career choice. Entrepreneurial discourses stress the 
nimbleness of the small, private investor, who might discover something that brokers do not: 
‘[small companies are] not actively followed because [the broker] can’t afford the time even 
to send someone out to visit them’ (Stewart). Figures in the region of 20% to 30% annually 
were quoted often. This expectation of high return is extremely resilient, and is able to 
withstand considerable evidence to the contrary. For example, having spent several minutes 
discussing the potential upside offered by smaller companies, Simon volunteered that his best 
performing investment has been MAN Group, an international behemoth at the time listed in 
the FTSE 100.   
 
                                                 
1
 http://www.incademy.com/pages/subject_index.htm?ginPtrCode=10002 [accessed 16 June 2010] 
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Such expectations constitute a general motivation for engaging in the activity, rather than a 
specific attachment to a given investment provider. In the next section I will consider how 
these attachments are achieved.  
 
Developing attachments: formatting calculative agencies 
 
As investors work to develop their skills and understanding of the markets, they begin to 
form more specific attachments to material devices, and also to specific individuals. 
Marketing knowledge, in the form of heterodox theories of market function and 
corresponding investment strategies, is performed through the devices that make the market 
present and visible: screens, telephones, and modes of calculation combine to instantiate the 
market (Hardie & MacKenzie, 2007; Knorr Cetina, 2005). These ‘scoping’ (Knorr Cetina, 
2005) devices carry marketing knowledge, for the marketing of products depends on 
profitable opportunities being made visible by certain understandings of market function. It 
follows that the adoption of a particular style of investing, driven by personality, identity and 
consumption preference has long-lasting effects and consequences: it specifies the 
agencement of an investor, it frames investment decisions, highlighting some factors as 
important and others as irrelevant, and it embeds the investor in a tightknit network of power 
relations that are performed through the distribution of calculation across the marketplace. 
Zwick and Dholakia (2006) have positioned investors as co-producers of the market 
understood as an epistemic consumption object, yet this is not a production without rules. 
Investor subjectivities are constituted by the tools and networks that are made available for 
the task: highly fragmented, individualised and attached to specific providers by knowledge, 
technology and affect.  
 
Narratives followed a common pattern as individuals struggled to develop their expertise. 
The investment service industry offered them a wide variety of means to develop and 
understand their investing practice. They might, for example, read magazines and books or 
buy audio-visual material – for Anne, the Investors Chronicle magazine was a ‘bible’ in her 
early days: Chris, was ‘totally self-taught’, through books and instructional videos; Terry 
purchased ‘fantastically expensive’ training CDs. Karl made use of a simulator, offered by 
one of the lay- focused brokers to draw in new custom: 
‘Around that time there was a computer simulation game called City Comment, you 
invest a virtual hundred thousand pounds, so I did that and brushed up on how you 
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invest in the stock market ... and I find I was that I was quite good at this, I wasn’t too 
bad at this in fact, so I decided that I would read a bit more into it and have a go at 
investing for myself’ 
 
Many of the interviewees attended training courses. Some, such as the free seminars I 
attended, were run by brokers and investment service firms as part of their marketing 
activities. Investors visited the City, spoke to experts and traded war stories for an evening. 
Market and marketing knowledge are present in the presentation of the trader on the podium; 
personal attachments are stimulated by acceptance of methods, theories and the associated 
purchase of materials. The excitement, investment worldliness and ‘secret knowledge’ shared 
by the speaker gives rise to affective bonds between consumers, heterodox knowledges and 
the technologies necessary to unpack the market’s mysteries. Investors become productive 
and engaged consumers, deploying their resources and investing their intellectual and 
financial capital in pursuit of capital growth and affective satisfaction. Another model was the 
high tariff – costing anything up to £2500 for a weekend – course offered by a ‘market 
expert’, frequently in conjunction with a particular piece of software or proprietary method. 
In each case, choice of investment strategy and platform becomes linked with the individual’s 
social identity and conception of their self. In the end, Max said, the choice of investing 
strategy ‘went down to personality and what you like the feel of’ (my italics). Just as an 
individual’s consumption choices become bound up with their identity (Bocock, 1993; 
McCracken, 1988) the choice of investing equipment and style is a matter of consumption 
preference, personality and identity.  The decision, once taken, will construct the individual’s 
agency in entirely different ways: while the chartist uses prices to predict the future, the 
‘fundamental’ investor hunts for value and potential in the accounts and media presentations 
of smaller quoted companies.   
 
At seminars and on the stands of investment shows, the representatives of investment service 
firms extolled the virtues of particular practices or techniques, and manufacturers of software 
explained how one aspect of market function (easily detectable through their secret 
algorithm) might be harnessed to deliver endless profits. Investors sought out strategies and 
methods, each representing a different kind of marketing knowledge, linked to the expertise 
and prestige of an individual. Max, a chartist, explained this process, emphasising the need 
for courses to present a ‘system’: 
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‘The Robert Newgrosh new skills I ended up doing first, because I could go on that 
one, and his approach, he had different topics over five days in those days were 
spread out so you had plenty of time to integrate it…For those five days it cost me 
probably less than half it would have cost for a weekend with Greg Secker, but 
[offered] no particular system. The other one, the Sandy Jedeja one, effectively did 
provide, or appeared to provide a whole system, and I’ll elaborate as to why that was.  
That was one day, it was just under 500 quid, so I thought it was quite good value.’ 
Max’s comments illustrate the linkages between marketing knowledge, individuals, and 
technologies. The attachments that began as investors first learnt their way into the market 
continue as they explore and develop new skills. Objects, events and phenomena of the 
market are rendered ‘tractable’ and ‘mobile’ through devices such as numbers, graphs and 
spreadsheets (Azimont & Araujo, 2010:96), until, as Mickey said:  
‘With a charting package it’s dead easy because … I select Fibonacci, and I click 
once on a high point with my mouse and click once on the low point and the lines are 
automatically drawn…’ 
 
A chartist’s identification with and commitment to a particular style of investing involves an 
intellectual commitment to an often idiosyncratic understanding of market ontology. The 
following comes from an ‘advertorial’ in a trading magazine: 
‘The Delta Phenomenon states that each and every market has an innate order that it 
follows. This innate order makes highs and lows predictable as far into the future as 
you want to go. The order of the market is based on the dynamic forces of nature. The 
Delta Phenomenon is based on the concept of time and space. It states that turning 
points in the market come at certain times which it is possible to determine long in 
advance. The time cycles are the result of the interaction between the sun, moon and 
the earth.’ (Albert, 2005:69) 
Mechanisms such as the ‘Delta Phenomenon’ are made credible by a belief, clearly 
articulated by interviewees, in hidden organising principles in the market. Terry, a chartist, 
links market movement to numbers found in tides, waves, pine cones, and the human body.  
He is a devotee of Elliott, from which Delta is derived: 
‘[Elliott] is a wave structure, a simple wave structure which is basically a series of 
impulse waves followed by a series of retracement waves, and the impulse is broken 
into a series of five simple waves upwards, and then you have two retracement waves, 
and then a series of ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘c’ waves…a series of five simple waves up followed 
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by three simple waves down…They are not always simple, sometimes they’re 
complex and so the retracement patterns are not always easy to see...’  
Yet it is possible to find these patterns, given the right equipment, for the relevant market 
knowledge is inscribed into the software, here algorithms for detecting shapes in the noise of 
market data.  Terry has spent several thousand pounds on purchasing training CDs and 
charting software, and attending courses, and invested most of his spare time for nine months 
on testing out new methods, with the hope of becoming a full-time investor in the near future. 
When one method disappointed he has moved onto another. Each is linked to a particular 
‘expert’, many of whom he has met in person on their training courses and whom he 
discussed by name during the interview. His investment devices configure the choices 
available to him by framing, disentangling, and offering possibilities, or promissions, for 
action (Callon, 2007). Terry’s charting simulations play out overnight on a four-screen, two-
computer laboratory, offering him each morning promissions for investment activity; his 
agencement as a chartist comprises computers, screens, software and data flows, his own 
ingenuity and action, a particular set of beliefs about the way the world is, and the principles 
of evaluation that stem from those beliefs.  
 
The small-cap investors, on the other hand, eschew technical wizardry for old-fashioned 
strategies, yet still find themselves reliant upon market devices to distribute (Hutchins, 1995) 
the calculative burden of investing. Stewart, for example, follows a ‘value-based’ (Graham, 
1973) approach in his small company portfolio. Here, he explains how he uses a printed 
directory of AIM-listed companies to quickly screen a market numbering hundreds of 
companies: 
 ‘I can rule out maybe 90% of them by just flicking over and seeing what they are 
doing and the names. What they are involved in and looking at the very minimal stuff 
[headline financial numbers and ratios]...I can see at a glance, that [many companies 
are] not going to interest me.’   
The directory is an unobtrusive, material device, inscribed with a particular cluster of scripts 
for selecting companies, including ratios for analysing stock value and performance. 
Complexities of decision are rendered into single, comparable numbers, such as the PEG 
ratio, its use explained by an analyst during an evening seminar thus: ‘typically a PEG of 0.75 
to 1 is good’. Anne assembles a scrapbook of cuttings, and consults her ‘bible’, the Investors 
Chronicle magazine. Trevor makes extensive use of a website, which: 
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 ‘...has a very, very detailed way of assessing companies, not simply on the bog 
standard kind of fundamentals, but they used all sorts of complicated algorithms as 
well, heaven knows how it all works out…It  is very detailed...’ 
The proprietary measure of Trevor’s preferred website is expressed as a number, specified to 
two decimal places. Yet, according to the website, the decimal places matter much less than 
the absolute polarity of the number: less than one is a ‘red flag’, and more than one a buy 
signal. Complex market information and a theory of investment practice are reduced to a 
choice between red and green flags, and Trevor is caught up in an agencement dedicated to a 
particular mode of market agency.   
 
In all instances the performativity of marketing knowledge, itself inseparable from market 
knowledge, is visible. It is seen in the discourses of market operation, which serve to frame 
investor decisions, and it is inscribed in the material agencements through which they share 
calculation and arrive at possibilities of action. The nonprofessional investor acts within a 
market-world that only makes sense to an outsider in the light of the relevant market(ing) 
knowledge: it illuminates and explains their actions. At the same time, the marketing 
knowledge captures and binds the investor to an investment service provider, through a 
discourse of possibility and change, through bodily affect and a carefully staged resistance to 
professional finance, and through the elaboration of divisions between different kinds of 
investor, so that being a follower of, for example, Elliott and Pivot at the same time would 
mean holding on to almost contradictory sets of belief about the way the market works 
(Roscoe & Howorth, 2009). Attachments are developed through specialised knowledge, 
embedded in proprietary tools, through the deployment of symbolic expertise by the 
celebrities of the investment service world, and through the emotional and intellectual 
commitments – the affects – that must be made by individual investors.  
 
Staying in the game: Discipline and confession 
 
Expectations of steady profit, whether delivered by the ‘holy grail’ (Chris) of perfect charting 
indicators, or through outwitting the professionals in the small company markets, sit 
uncomfortably with the overwhelming empirical evidence that lay-investors perform less well 
than the rest of the market (Barber & Odean, 2001; Barber et al., 2009; Barberis & Thaler, 
2002). Persisting with investment in the face of growing losses requires investors to invoke 
the seductive possibilities of future success, and manage responsibility for market losses. The 
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alternative would be to accept a bitter truth: that there is no easy money to be made in the 
markets, that there are no holy grails or magic formula, and that trading costs will soak up 
what little profits can be made (Odean, 1999).  
 
Investors may disguise losses through strategies of mental accounting (Thaler, 1999). Some 
investors, such as Anne, treated investment monies as distinct from other money, as 
suggested by Zelizer (1994, 2005). Others committed wholeheartedly to the exercise, 
throwing pension funds, life savings, and future career possibilities to the cause of investing.  
Although self-deception and separate monies may explain the willingness to weather 
temporary losses, it does not appear to provide a satisfactory answer to the much broader 
question of why investors exist at all, under such circumstances. More specifically, how do 
the carefully crafted subjectivities of individual investors survive extended losses? Interviews 
appeared to move from method to method – for example Terry’s progress through charting 
courses ’– but not one of my interviewees had any intention of giving up on the whole 
enterprise. Instead, in a mirror of the governmentalist strategy of judging individuals against 
the population (Munro, 2012) individuals took personal responsibility for failings to achieve 
returns equivalent to the market. This responsibility became apparent in interviews and in the 
public spaces of investing in the shape of war stories and confessions. I suggest that 
investors’ continued acceptance of poor performance may be dependent upon a final 
disciplinary technology, the confession: a normalising, disciplinary device, a ritual through 
which the confessant unburdens themselves and is healed (Foucault, 1978; Munro & Randall, 
2007). 
 
First of all, there are narratives of possibility. Terry, who hoped to give up his job and 
become a full-time investor, enthused about the possibilities offered by a career in investment 
and trading. He compared the speed of returns to other careers, arguing that his nine months 
is nothing against the years spent becoming a doctor or dentist, and described his vision of 
working from wherever he wished. A career in trading, he said, ‘gives you the ultimate 
freedom because all you need is an Internet connection and a computer, and you could be 
anywhere in the world’.  There is a similar sentiment in the comments of Chris, a long-term 
day trader:  
‘I enjoy the independence, and I enjoy the potential to make good money sometime in 
the future when I can get on top of myself. It’s a very creative occupation, and also it 
does have the promise of a lot of money if you get it right’ 
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Then there are narratives of necessary pain, of endurance in pursuit of a goal. Chris added: 
‘They say you’ve got to pay for your education one way or the other. I decided to pay for it 
by losing money in the market.’ This is the hard grit of investing: expertise, determination 
and sacrifice are necessary components of investment success. Mickey defined himself as a 
serious investor, forced by redundancy to earn his living this way. He is scornful of 
dilettantes and hobby investors: 
‘A chap I know for instance said “Yeah, I think [options trading] is great fun, I really 
enjoy it, I put £1000-£1500 in the kitty every 18 months, it normally lasts me about 18 
months” I thought “For heaven’s sake!”.’ 
Simon and Max were using savings from previous employment to try out  investing ‘careers’.  
For Mickey, being a professional means putting more money into the market, taking risks, 
and most of all taking investing seriously. He rejects the cosseted life of hobby investors out 
of hand: 
‘I went on a two day course at Hammersmith and I only lasted one day. I just couldn’t 
stand it any more ... there was something like 20 helpers to check you in and show 
you around and make sure you’re having a good time and all of this rubbish, it’s just 
hangers on who had been to this course before. I didn’t find any of them were making 
too much money.’ 
 
When success remains elusive, investors blame themselves for letting emotion cloud their 
judgement. Chris spoke of the potential to ‘make good money sometime in the future when I 
can get on top of myself’. Investors guarded against attachment to any share and were 
rigorous in watching the prices on their portfolios. Albert cautioned that ‘One of the golden 
rules about it is have no sentiment whatsoever for the share you’re buying. The silly 
statement is the share doesn’t know you’ve bought it’. Karl spent about half an hour a day 
and two hours at the weekend ‘to review what happened during the week...to make sure I 
don’t ever lose sight of what I’m doing and don’t ever get cocky’. Albert too reviewed his 
gains and losses in price terms on a daily basis:  
‘Every night I work out precisely to the penny how much I have made or lost that day. 
Because I’ve found that if you take your eye off the ball a week becomes a 
fortnight… and that particular share has dropped 35% in a fortnight, and by then from 
bitter experience I know it’s too late.’ 
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Mike and Stewart both talked about investing ‘rationally’, while Robert talked about his 
‘systems’ and ‘databases’. Trevor said:  
‘Emotion does get in the way. If you can trade, or invest, without any emotion at all 
then you’re at a big advantage to other people. If you take all the emotional baggage 
out of it, it’s going to do you a lot of good…when it’s your own money you’re much 
more emotionally involved.’ 
 
Optimism and self-discipline notwithstanding, performance often fell below the expectations 
of investors. Interviews became venues for confession, normalisation, and perhaps even 
healing, as individuals sought to justify their continued investment activity. Mike 
complained:  
‘The investing I did for my mother and sister, they have made quite a bit of money. 
But being very cautious, they were in shares like Glaxo and BP, which were going up 
steadily and paying dividends. My history of investing in small companies has always 
been a disaster.’ 
These investor laments were distinguished by regrets and should-haves. Robert saw a year’s 
worth of profits wiped out by one bad trade: 
‘I met a bit of a reverse on that one, so my net position on the year is actually negative 
which is not too good… I should have sold it, but …I kept holding it, and it went 
down and down and down and down’ 
 
These sentiments were shared in interviews but are typical of many conversations between 
investors, online and off-line. The war stories of investors at meetings have a ritual element, 
serving to normalize the risks, losses and possibilities of success, and to lionize those who 
can cope with all three. At one evening seminar Sunil told me that he had lost £5,000 on his 
early attempts at high risk margin trading, trapped in positions that he found difficult to 
escape. The meeting places provided by investment clubs and online bulletin boards serve as 
venues where investors can confirm their intention to participate in the market and 
commiserate over failure (Roscoe, 2013). Albert told the story of the founder of his 
investment club, who wrote: 
‘an open letter in the Investors Chronicle, and said ‘I’m retired, I’m doing this and it’s 
a very lonely business and I’m very, very dismayed at how badly I’m doing. If there 
are any fellow travellers out there who’d like to meet for lunch once a month and 
commiserate and chat over the stock market, please write’. 
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60 replied to the letter and 40 attended the first meeting: success is perhaps more elusive than 
investors might readily admit. Ironically, the first meeting was held in a broker’s office, and 
subsequent meetings quickly turned into opportunities for the broker to push more services 
towards investors, who were forced to find their own private spaces in the public houses of 
the city.  
 
Confession and commiseration provide a means for investors to normalise their losses and to 
construct actives that attribute blame and offer possibilities for better futures. Talk of 
rationality, systems and of removing emotional baggage, or even of sheer bad luck  
suggests that losses are the result of freak circumstances, rather than a systematic problem 
relating to the size, ability and informational resources of lay-investors. The investors’ self-
supervision has a panoptic quality, as if they have internalised the disciplinary gaze levelled 
on them by investment service providers. Yet it is noticeable that investors must provide their 
own spaces for commiseration, or at least subvert those already offered to them: the lunch 
club attendees pushed out of the broker’s office, the small group huddled in the corner of an 
investment seminar trading war stories, or the message board discussion that slides towards a 
private e-mail exchange. The agencements of discourse and material devices that construct 
investor subjectivities are panoptic, in the sense that they leave no room for dissent, yet the 
problem of poor performance is so pressing that investors must find a means of managing it. I 
suggest they do so through making niches in the apparatus of investment spaces, online and 
off, as places where they may confess, normalise and work through their investment 
problems. As the open letter shows, the confessional is talked into existence in by the 
investors themselves, and the confession, in that sense, is owned by the investors. It 
represents a necessary mechanism for the balancing of individual agencies with the 
unproductive yet inescapable material agencements of investment. As such, it forms an 
essential part of the captation of investors, and offers a theoretical linkage between notions of 
governmentality and theories of hybrid material agency.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has set out to examine non-professional investment as a practice performed by 
marketing knowledge. From the starting point that marketing knowledge is performative 
(Araujo et al., 2010) it has invoked the late-Foucauldian writings on governance under neo-
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liberalism to suggest that power relations are circular, recursive and self-reproducing (Zwick 
& Knott, 2009), embedded in the agencements of non-professional investment. Finally, it has 
argued that investment spaces provide sites for confessional activities where investors can 
manage the conflicts between the promise and obligation of investment and the frequent lack 
of success that the occupation brings.  
 
What does it mean to suggest in this context that power relations are circular, recursive and 
self-reproducing? Financial markets constitute a particular form of post-industrial 
consumption. Their immateriality means that they must be produced, made visible, and 
worked upon, and they comprise a relativist playground where there is no ‘real’ price, but a 
tug of war between rival valuations to be settled by capital and organizational power. Those 
working in financial institutions benefit not only from resources of capital, but also from 
organizational infrastructures (Beunza & Stark, 2004) and specialized technologies (Beunza 
& Muniesa, 2005). Working as scientist and toolmaker (Knorr Cetina & Bruegger, 2000), the 
professional trader is a sense-maker, who, paraphrasing Law and Urry (2004), uses her 
laboratory of screens and calculators to create multiple market worlds, all different yet 
equally valid. The global financial market is endlessly performed by, and embedded in, the 
specialized knowledge and tools of its participants.  Lay-investors also perform the market, 
yet their performance is wrapped up in circulating notions of market function which are, at 
the same time, the marketing knowledge through which products and services are sold. The 
market unrolls for lay-investors, not as a vast, homogenous tapestry (Knorr Cetina, 2005) but 
as a highly fragmented and differentiated place of post-social consumption in which 
individuals are entangled, labouring to produce a version of the market in which they might 
discover a career, a pension, or freedom from faceless financial institutions.  Marketing 
knowledge is performative in the sense that it is also market knowledge, what MacKenzie 
(2006) calls a ‘Barnesian performativity’: use of analytical theories or tools constructing 
localized investment worlds that resemble those theories or tools. 
 
As a caution, I must recognize the self-fulfilling aspect of my own analysis, where the 
intervention of the researcher becomes a case of performativity in its own right. Interviews 
became spaces for confession and the interviewer thereby another channel of 
governmentality; individual lay-investors’ spoken performances of market function and 
profit-seeking become idiosyncratic constructions of markets. This is, perhaps, a specific 
instance of more general complaints over the status of sociology of knowledge (Pickering, 
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1992). A scrupulously symmetrical approach necessitates reflexivity regarding my own 
argument, and the recognition that it is as fragile a construction as the performances of the 
investors, just one of many possible laboratory worlds (Law & Urry, 2004). However, a 
reflective awareness over the limitations of knowledge production does not, I suggest, 
invalidate an investigation of the material agencements surrounding individual investors. Just 
as diagnostic machinery functions away from the ethnographic gaze, so investor 
performances are anchored in material devices inscribed with structures of text and discourse 
– ways of doing and seeing in the market – that persist beyond the moment of interview or 
the non-participant observation of a social gathering. I have attempted to give these market 
devices a voice through the reflections of the investors themselves, hardly naive realists when 
it comes to market ontologies. Recognizing the agency of market devices, not least in terms 
of their ability to configure bespoke market actors for investment service firms, offers a 
powerful means of problematizing naïve assumptions about the reality of market process and 
order, and opens up investment activity to a critical and political reading.  
 
We can characterize lay-investing as a form of ‘immaterial labour’, as multiplying market 
productions form an ‘untoward land’ (Thrift, 2013) where new value for marketers can be 
found. Investors’ selves are the raw material of production, with personal judgements and 
‘what you like the feel of’ the basis of the decision to become an investor of a particular kind. 
I suggest that, in a shareholder democracy, the activities of shareholders themselves have 
been added to the regime of post-Fordist production. The investor becomes self-entrepreneur, 
producer of her own satisfaction, manager of her own capital, and foundational member of 
the social contract under neoliberalism. In the end, as the notion of confession and 
commiseration suggests, it is the responsibility of individuals to stay in the game, to keep 
working towards an imagined future prosperity. New modes of investment proliferate: novel 
individual subjectivities, not chartist or fundamentalist, but a follower of Fibonacci, or Delta, 
or a hunter of gymnastic fleas. The governance of non-professional investors is centripetal 
and circulatory, not centrifugal and static (Munro, 2012). In each case the agencement 
gathered around the investor provides the technical and material apparatus of market agency, 
as a given subjectivity demands. When such a variety of knowledges are on offer, it is the 
weight of capital, or lack of it, that most affects lay-investors. MacKenzie’s (2006) 
demonstrations of the performativity of options pricing imply that global institutions enjoy 
enough power to bend the market to the shape of their theory. The heterodox models and 
market conceptions of lay-investors, on the other hand, exist in a permanent state of friction 
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with those envisaged by more powerful actors. Power in the market is represented not only by 
calculative ability, or specialised discourses and secret knowledge, but also pure capital 
collected in the bridgeheads of global finance (Clark, 2005).    
 
Understanding power relations as circular and recursive, yet still bound up in calculative 
ability and marketing knowledge, offers a means of further theorizing the attachment (Knorr 
Cetina & Bruegger, 2000; Zwick & Dholakia, 2006) of investors to the market, to service 
providers, and to each other. I have drawn particular attention to the role of affect (Deville, 
2013) in encouraging investment activity and stabilising relationships with service providers. 
There are many parallels with Deville’s analysis of debt collection: relationships do not stem 
solely from a direct commercial transaction (although investors are at least indirectly buyers 
of investment services, unlike debtors in default) but are sustained by a network of 
associations with market knowledge, discourses of antagonism, success and triumph, and a 
bodily engagement with investment services, via the internet message board or the City 
seminar room. Investment firms, like debt collectors, seek to stabilise both the product – one 
of many possible presentations of the market – and the consumer, and to ‘solidify and 
intensify’ affective bonds between customer and provider (ibid. p11-12). Preda (2009) has 
shown how solitary investors seek to dramatize their market interactions, speaking imagined 
others out of the screens, just as the day traders studied by Zaloom (2003) delighted in 
battling the imaginary ‘spoofer’. Investors build relationships with others known only online 
(Roscoe, 2013), and subvert the spectacular spaces of shows and exhibitions as venues for 
confession and commiseration. Such webs of attachment and affect may be further 
complemented by an understanding of investment as aesthetics (Aspara, 2009), although it is 
beyond the scope of the present paper. It is likely to be the case that those who invest in 
collective settings, such as investment clubs, encounter other modes of stabilizing and 
solidifying, and other networks – as do those who choose investments on the basis of 
collectively negotiated brand judgements: no Lay-z-boy sofas or Harley Davidson motorbikes 
(Harrington, 2007). Yet the individualizing nature of market knowledge encountered among 
my interviewees puts them naturally at odds with investment clubs, as their frustrated 
comments show, and justifies a methodological engagement at the level of individual 
investors.      
 
Marketing knowledge and market devices are increasingly understood to play a performative 
role in the construction of market participants, and the calculative strategies, decisions and 
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investment performances of lay-investors have been extensively researched from this 
perspective. Consumer researchers within marketing have long recognized the role of objects 
in consumer identity and culture (Belk, 1988; Schouten & Alexander, 1995), and investment 
has also been studied as a consumption activity in the social settings of investment clubs 
(Harrington, 2007).  More recently, researchers have begun to consider ‘post-social’ 
consumption objects including the stock market (Zwick & Dholakia, 2006; Zwick & Knott, 
2009), and associated modes of production and novel possibilities for ethics and commons 
(Arvidsson, 2010). Critical perspectives on marketing have emphasised the role of discourses 
in constructing subjectivities of consumption (Saren et al., 2007). In this paper I have sought 
to elaborate commonalities between studies of market agents as collective, distributed 
achievements, and the flourishing literature of governance through marketing knowledge. 
The activities of lay-investors illustrate how devices may perform calculative market agents 
and outcomes, and at the same time constitute investor subjectivities: productive, docile 
consumers of investments and investment technologies, capable of disciplining themselves in 
the face of continued difficulties in the market. In doing so, I have sought to provide a novel 
account of a long-standing problem: why do lay-investors invest? Only one instance did an 
investor indicate that he was no longer prepared to continue. Simon eventually concluded that 
galloping elephants were nothing more than a ‘marketing ploy’, and that he was abandoning 
value investing. Instead, he became a chartist. The ‘sorry state’ (De Bondt, 1998:832) of lay-
investing is a complex, technical achievement.  
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